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KILLING DADDY: DEVELOPING A SELF-DEFENSE
STRATEGY FOR THE ABUSED CHILD
JOELLE ANNE MORENOt
"All happy families resemble one another, but each un-
happy family is unhappy in its own way."
INTRODUCTION
Children1 rarely kill their parents.2 When a child commits parri-
cide,3 the killing usually follows a history of violent abuse by that par-
ent." The effect of intrafamily violence on the perceptions and behavior
t B.A. 1984, Swarthmore College; J.D. Candidate 1989, University of
Pennsylvania.
* L. TOLSTOY, ANNA KARENINA I (A. Maude trans. 1970).
Throughout this Comment, "children" will refer to adolescents and teenagers.
See Timnick, Fatal Means for Children to End Abuse, L.A. Times, Aug. 31, 1986, pt.
II, at 1, col. 1, 3, col. 1 (noting that the average age of children who kill a parent is
"about 15 h or 16").
2 See, e.g., Blodgett, Self-Defense: Parricide Defendants Cite Sexual Abuse as
Justification, A.B.A. J., June 1, 1987, at 36, 37 ("About 400 homicides per year in this
country are cases of children killing their parents or having someone else do it for
them."); Berg, Lawyer Focuses Practice on Defense Consulting on Parricide, L.A.
Daily J., July 17, 1987, § 2, at 1, col. 1, 1, col. 4 (reporting the estimate of Paul
Mones, an expert in juvenile law who specializes in parricide cases, that only "3 per-
cent of the 20,000 murders that occur each year are instances of parricide"); Chambers,
Children Citing Self-Defense in Murder of Parents, N.Y. Times, Oct. 12, 1986, § 1,
at 38, col. 3, 38, col. 3 ("Studies involving parricide . . . show that about 2 percent of
all homicides in the nation, about 400 killings a year, are committed by children
against their parents."); cf. Mones, The Relationship Between Child Abuse and Parri-
cide: An Overview, in UNHAPPY FAMILIES: CLINICAL AND RESEARCH PERSPECTIVES
ON FAMILY VIOLENCE 31, 38 (E. Newberger & R. Bourne eds. 1985) (describing how
recent nationwide publicity of cases of matricide and patricide has been misinterpreted
as evidence of an increase in violent juvenile crime).
I The word "parricide" will be used throughout this Comment to mean "[tihe
murder of one's parent." BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY 914 (3d ed. 1969). Parri-
cide can involve killing either one's father or mother. See THE AMERICAN HERITAGE
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 954 (1979) (defining parricide to include
the act of murdering one's father or mother). There is some confusion, however, about
the definition of the term "parricide." See, e.g., BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1006 (5th
ed. 1979) (defining parricide as "[tihe crime of killing one'sfather" (emphasis added)).
" See, e.g., Blodgett, supra note 2, at 36 ("Well over 90 percent of the kids who
kill their parents are physically, emotionally or sexually abused [by that parent].");
Mones, supra note 2, at 31 (describing the "alarming" fact that in almost every case of
parricide the defendant was the victim of severe child abuse by the murdered parent);
Post, Adolescent Parricide in Abusive Families, 61 CHILD WELFARE 445, 445 (1982)
("[P]arricide is often the product of the perpetrator's chaotic emotions that result, in
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of its victims has already been recognized in the context of the "bat-
tered woman's syndrome."5 This Comment will explore the judicial
and public reaction to similar self-defense claims raised by battered
children and argue that these defenses are equally, if not more,
compelling.
Self-defense is based on the principle that a person "who is unlaw-
fully attacked by another, and who has no opportunity to resort to the
law for his defense, should be able to take reasonable steps to defend
himself."'6 The factfinder in a homicide case must conclude that the
turn, from a pattern of child abuse [by the parent who was later murdered]."); Thomp-
son, Battered Child Syndrome Gets No Respect, L.A. Daily J., Apr. 26, 1985, § 1, at
3, col. 1, 3, col. 1. ("Virtually all of the 254 children who killed a parent in 1982 had
suffered a long period of abuse at the hands of the parent . . ").
" The "battered woman's syndrome" was developed by Dr. Lenore Walker, a
psychologist who specializes in battered women, to describe the psychological character-
istics of abused women and the battering relationship. Dr. Walker describes the bat-
tering relationship as composed of three distinct and recurring phases: a tension-build-
ing stage, followed by an acute battering incident, and finally a period of contrition and
affection. See L. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN 55-70 (1979). Dr. Walker's the-
ory has been recognized as the seminal work on the psycho-social effects of battering on
adult women. See Schneider, Describing and Changing: Women's Self-Defense Work
and the Problem of Expert Testimony on Battering, 9 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 195,
202 (1986).
The battered woman's syndrome is a psychological profile of a woman trapped in
a battering cycle. Research in this area is based on adult relationships. Certain aspects
of this theory are therefore inappropriate in the context of parent-child relationships.
For example, the psychological state of "learned helplessness," a term borrowed from
the work of behaviorist psychologists, see, e.g., M. SELIGMAN, HELPLESSNESS: ON DE-
PRESSION, DEVELOPMENT, AND DEATH 21-27 (1975) (describing animal experiments
showing how, after mistreatment, animals develop a psychological inability to help
themselves when exposed to additional pain); Hiroto, Locus of Control and Learned
Helplessness, 102 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY 187, 187 (1974) (identifying fail-
ure to escape as the primary characteristic of learned helplessness), was discussed at
length by Dr. Walker to explain why battered women do not leave battering relation-
ships. See L. WALKER, supra, at 42-54. When child abuse begins at an early age, there
is little need to explain the fact that the child did not leave the relationship, as that is
practically impossible for a young child. See Mones, supra note 2, at 36-37; Thomp-
son, supra note 4, § 1, at 3, col. 1.
In addition, this Comment purposely omits any discussion of "learned helpless-
ness" because, without it, a self-defense claim for battered children is not open to the
criticism that it is a quasi-insanity defense. Unfortunately, this aspect of Dr. Walker's
theory has focused attention on the battered woman as passive and unable to respond
reasonably, which creates "images of a psychological defense-a separate defense and/
or an impaired mental state defense." Schneider, supra, at 199.
S W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW § 5.7(a), at 454 (2d student ed.
1986). Some states incorporate a "duty to retreat" into their laws of self-defense.
Within these jurisdictions, the intended victim is not justified in using deadly force if
she can withdraw from the encounter. See id. at 460-61; see also, e.g., CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 53a-19(b) (West 1985) (providing that an intended victim has the duty
to withdraw if she can do so in complete safety); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.15(2)(a)
(McKinney 1987) (same). This aspect of self-defense law, although it would be impor-
tant in developing a self-defense claim in a "duty to retreat" jurisdiction, will not be
discussed in this Comment. One reason for this is the existence of an exception when a
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defendant perceived an imminent deadly or serious attack7 and that her
perception was reasonable.' This model is inappropriate when a parent
and child are involved, because it presupposes the objective and rational
observations of two strangers. Abused9 children, like battered women,
perceive the behavior of their batterer with a degree of knowledge and
familiarity not accounted for in the rational observation standard of the
self-defense model.'0 Because of this difference in perception, child
abuse-parricide cases will always require expert analysis of the defend-
ant's ability to assess and respond to the behavior of her batterer."
person is attacked in her own home. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-19(b)(1)
(West 1985) (providing that, as long as she is not the initial aggressor, a victim has no
duty to retreat in her own home); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:3-4(b)(2)(b)(1) (West 1982)
(same); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.15(2)(a)(i) (McKinney 1987) (same); 18 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 505(b)(2)(ii)(A) (Purdon 1983) (same). But see N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2C:3-4(b)(2)(b)(i) (West 1982) (imposing a duty to retreat when the attacker and
the victim occupy the home where the attack takes place).
' See Ridolfi & Arguedas, Women's Self Defense Cases: Jurywork and Legal
Strategy, in JURYWORK: SYSTEMATIC TECHNIQUES 223, 224 (B. Bonora & E. Krauss
eds. 1979) [hereinafter Jurywork].
I See C. EWING, BATTERED WOMEN WHO KILL 47 (1987); W. LAFAVE & A.
ScoTT, supra note 6, at 454.
1 "Abuse," "intrafamily abuse," and "family violence" in this Comment refer spe-
cifically to child abuse. Other forms of intrafamily violence will not be discussed. This
is not meant to imply, however, that other forms of abuse are not significant or preva-
lent. See, e.g., M. STRAUS, R. GELLES & S. STEINMETZ, BEHIND CLOSED DOORS 36
(1980) [hereinafter BEHIND CLOSED DOORS] (discussing husband abuse).
10 The landmark case of State v. Wanrow, 88 Wash. 2d 221, 559 P.2d 548
(1977), contained the first judicial recognition of a subjective standard of self-defense
for battered women on trial for killing their abusers. Twelve years have passed since
the Supreme Court of Washington ruled that a battered woman defendant "is entitled
to have the jury consider her actions in the light of her own perceptions of the situa-
tion." Id. at 240, 559 P.2d at 559. Meanwhile, other states have followed Washington's
example. See, e.g., State v. Hodges, 239 Kan. 63, 72, 716 P.2d 563, 569 (1986) (adopt-
ing a subjective standard of self-defense for battered women); People v. Torres, 128
Misc. 2d 129, 130-31, 488 N.Y.S.2d 358, 360 (Sup. Ct. 1985) ("The standard for the
evaluation of the reasonableness of the defendant's belief and conduct is not what the
ordinary prudent man would have believed. . . . [but] rather, whether the defendant's
subjective belief as to the imminence and seriousness of the danger was reasonable.").
Even when a state declares that this "reasonable belief" imports an objective ele-
ment into the determination of the reasonableness of the defendant's actions, the in-
quiry will still initially involve an examination of the defendant's assessment of her
situation, followed by a determination whether, in light of the circumstances in which
the defendant found herself, a reasonable person would have believed what she be-
lieved. See People v. Goetz, 68 N.Y.2d 96, 114-15, 497 N.E.2d 41, 52, 506 N.Y.S.2d
18, 29-30 (1986).
11 See Jahnke v. State, 682 P.2d 991, 1043 (Wyo. 1984) (Rose, J., dissenting)
(stating that the reason for introducing evidence of the history of abuse of the parricide
defendant is to explain how battered people perceive and respond to the "imminence of
danger"); cf. Thompson, supra note 4, § 1, at 3, col. 1 ("[J]udges can't comprehend
abuse so severe as to drive an otherwise blameless youth to kill. 'Children in our society
aren't considered to be people who have rights like adults.'" (quoting Robert Tiedeken,
the Cheyenne, Wyoming, defense attorney who represented Deborah Jahnke)); infra
notes 27-29 and accompanying text (discussing how a history of abuse may increase the
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In cases involving battered women, the effect of violent abuse .has
been recognized as " 'beyond the ken' " of the average juror.12 Thus,
use of expert testimony is generally accepted in such cases in order to
"describe common psychological and social characteristics of battered
women." 13 This information is used to "educate the judge and jury
about the common experience of battered women, [and] to explain the
context in which an individual battered woman acted."
14
Any judicial resistance to child abuse-parricide self-defense claims
is puzzling, given the patterns of abuse"6 and the fact that these self-
defense claims are "virtually identical to [those] used in cases where
abused women kill their husbands or lovers." 6 Despite these factors,
courts generally have not fully accepted self-defense claims for child
abuse-parricide defendants." Battered women, but not battered chil-
dren,' have been allowed to develop self-defense claims that use their
personal history of violence to "explain why their perception of danger
was reasonable."' Because of this distinction, battered children, unlike
victim's ability to perceive danger from her abuser).
" Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 407 A.2d 626, 635 (D.C. 1979) (quoting Dyas v.
United States, 376 A.2d. 827, 832 (D.C.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 973 (1977)). See
generally MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, § 13, at 33-34 (3d ed. 1984) (discussing the
admissibility of expert testimony in situations in which a jury is not "competent" to
draw inferences).
"3 Schneider, supra note 5, at 207; see also Recent Developments, The Use of
Expert Testimony Concerning the "Battered Wife Syndrome," 8 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC.
505, 506 (1985) (providing a list of cases that hold that expert testimony on the bat-
tered wife syndrome is admissible).
14 Schneider, supra note 5, at 201.
15 See supra note 4 and accompanying text; see also Lubenow, When Kids Kill
Their Parents, NEWSWEEK, June 27, 1983, at 35, 35 ("Usually parent killing involves
a drunken, physically abusive father killed by a son who sees himself as the protector of
not only himself but also of his mother and siblings."); Mones, supra note 2, at 37
(asserting that child abuse destroys traditional family support systems and roles).
18 Mones, supra note 2, at 37; see also Thompson, supra note 4, § 1, at 3, col. 1
(describing a self-defense claim for child abuse-parricide defendants as "arguably more
compelling" than a similar claim for battered women).
11 See, e.g., Blodgett, supra note 2, at 37 ("The majority of children accused of
killing their parents are convicted, with some serving 'very long' prison terms . . .);
Thompson, supra note 4, § 1, at 3, col. 1 (reporting the statement of Paul Mones, an
expert on child abuse-parricide cases, that "no judge has accepted the self-defense claim
completely"); see also Timnick, supra note 1, pt. II, at 2, col. 1 (stating that legal
experts familiar with child abuse-parricide cases attribute the "discrepent outcomes of
essentially similar cases ...[to] the specific circumstances surrounding each murder,
the region in which the crime occurred, the sophistication of the defense, the makeup of
the jury, the reaction of the judge and, perhaps most importantly, the strength of the
evidence of severe child abuse"). But see infra notes 117-21 and accompanying text
(discussing the acquittal of child abuse victim Johnny Juhanatov on charges of attempt-
ing to murder his abusive father).
"8 Crocker, The Meaning of Equality for Battered Women Who Kill Men in Self-
Defense, 8 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 121, 141 (1985); see also Blackman, Potential Uses
for Expert Testimony: Ideas Toward the Representation of Battered Women Who Kill,
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their adult women counterparts, are unable to achieve significant suc-
cess in the courts.
This Comment will explore the connection between child abuse
and parricide in the context of developing a self-defense claim. Several
recent cases will be examined in conjunction with a review of psycho-
logical and social theories of child abuse. The case studies are intended
to provide perspective on the legal problems that confront child abuse-
parricide defendants. This Comment will argue that the recent, well
documented, "dramatic increase in society's knowledge about sexual
abuse"' 9 and the resultant increase in public and professional aware-
ness of the problem of family violence20 have paved the way for self-
defense strategies in child abuse-parricide cases. It will conclude by
predicting that these claims may soon achieve the same level of judicial
recognition as those of battered adult women."'
I. SELF-DEFENSE, CHILD ABUSE, AND PARRICIDE:
ESTABLISHING THE CONNECTION
When a battered child strikes back and kills her battering parent,
defense attorneys today are more likely to argue that the killing was
justified as self-defense;22 self-defense for child abuse-parricide defend-
ants "appears to be emerging as a viable defense."23 Self-defense claims
for battered children, however, as for battered women, remain problem-
atic. A major source of difficulty is the traditional definition of self-
defense, which assumes male, stranger-to-stranger assault.2" To an out-
9 WOMEN'S Rrs. L. REP. 227, 230 (1986) (asserting that the dilemma faced by bat-
tered women reveals a unique context in which their acts of self-defense can be under-
stood); Schneider, supra note 5, at 196-97 n.6 (citing 46 cases between 1980 and 1985
in which battered women were allowed to raise self-defense claims).
11 Blodgett, supra note 2, at 36 (quoting Mones, supra note 2, at 36); see also
Korbin, Child Abuse and Neglect: The Cultural Context, in THE BATTERED CHILD
23 (R. Heifer & R. Kempe 4th ed. 1987) ("Child abuse emerged. . . [as] a matter of
public and professional concern in the United States in the early 1960s.").
20 In cases involving battered women, recent efforts to heighten public awareness
have exposed a history of condoning and sanctioning wife abuse. See BEHIND CLOSED
DOORS, supra note 9, at 9-10; Crocker, supra note 18, at 129 n.35.
21 "[Now that courts are routinely treating juveniles as adults in criminal cases,
they will begin to realize that children have the same rights as adults, as well."
Thompson, supra note 4, § I, at 3, col. 2 (paraphrasing Cheyenne, Wyoming defense
lawyer Robert Tiedeken, who represented Deborah Jahnke).
22 See Chambers, supra note 2, § 1, at 38, cols. 3-4 ("[D]efense lawyers are now
more likely to mount a vigorous and often highly publicized defense based on the idea
that battered children, like battered wives, reach a point where their fear of being killed
becomes unbearable and they kill in self-defense.").
23 Id.
24 See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text (discussing traditional self-defense
theory). See generally Stell, Close Encounters of the Lethal Kind: The Use of Deadly
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sider, it appears that many battered persons kill at times that are less
dangerous or threatening than other situations that they have sur-
vived. 5 This perception, however, which is shaped by traditional self-
defense doctrine, omits an essential component of the dynamics of fam-
ily violence: the victim's familiarity with her abuser.2"
Battered children and women perceive, more acutely than stran-
gers, the imminence and degree of danger at the hands of their abusers.
Victims of continued abuse "become attuned to stages of violence ...
[and learn to] interpret certain conduct to indicate an imminent attack
or a more severe attack."2 To a battered person, subtle changes, like a
new method of abuse, may create a reasonable fear of imminent severe
or deadly violence that might be imperceptible to an outsider.28 Because
victims of abuse know their abusers and their capacities for violence,
they may strike back at times that seem to the outsider less
dangerous than previous episodes of abuse, or that may not
seem life-threatening at all. . . .[They] may reasonably be-
lieve that their lives are at risk because of changes in the
abuser's routine style of assault, or because the abuser says
or does something that, in the past, has signalled great
danger.29
Traditional self-defense theory generally fails to account for famil-
iarity and heightened awareness." Critics of the standard approach
Force in Self Defense, 49 J.L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 113, 113-117 (1986) (describing
the historical development of the law of self-defense).
"5 "The testimony may demonstrate how repeated physical abuse can so heighten
a battered woman's fear and her awareness 9f her husband's physical capabilities that
she considers him as dangerous asleep as awake, as dangerous before an attack as dur-
ing one." Crocker, supra note 18, at 141. For an example of a trial court's confusion of
"immediate" with "imminent," see State v. Hodges, 239 Kan. 63, 74, 716 P.2d 563,
571 (1986) (discussing this confusion as a reason for reversing the conviction of a bat-
tered woman for murdering her abusing spouse); see also Margolick, When Battered
Wives Kill, Does the Law Treat Them Fairly?, N.Y. Times, Dec. 11, 1983, at ES, col.
1, E8, col. 1 (quoting Elizabeth Schneider of Brooklyn Law School, an authority on the
rights of battered women, as saying that "self-defense arguments are usually difficult
for jurors to grasp, especially where there is no attacker with knife drawn or gun
cocked").
26 See Rodwan, The Defense of Those Who Defend Themselves, 65 MICH. B.J.
64, 64 (1986).
2 Crocker, supra note 18, at 127.
21 "Very often, the defendant will identify a threatening movement toward her by
the deceased as the reason why she pulled the trigger." Jurywork, supra note 7, at 6;
see also Robinson, Defense Strategies for Battered Women Who Assault Their Mates:
State v. Curry, 4 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 161, 171 (1981) (explaining that "battered
women become very familiar with behavioral cues from their batterer").
29 Blackman, supra note 18, at 230.
20 See id. at 229.
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suggest that self-defense law must become more "individualized.""1
Even without a general revision of self-defense doctrine, many of the
goals of individualization might be accomplished through the develop-
ment of case-specific justification claims assisted by child abuse research
and expert testimony. 32
Traditionally, expert testimony will be admitted if the court deter-
mines that the evidence is relevant, 3 and the expert is capable of
"draw[ing] inferences from the facts which a jury would not be compe-
tent to draw." '34 A court will reach this conclusion by using one of two
standards. 5 The first standard requires that the court find the subject
matter to be beyond the comprehension of the ordinary juror, that the
expert be qualified to give an opinion on the subject, and that knowl-
edge of this subject be sufficiently advanced to allow for an expert opin-
ion." Under the second standard, "[i]f scientific, technical or other spe-
cialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the
evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert
by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify
thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. 37 State courts have
applied these standards in order to determine the admissibility of expert
testimony concerning the effects of intrafamily abuse on battered
3' One critic explains:
Individualization involves "'a full consideration of individual differences
and capacities' when determining whether a defendant should be held ac-
countable for a particular crime." Rather than focusing on the hypotheti-
cal reasonable man, individualization demands that the jury inquire into
the individual defendant's characteristics and culpability. . . . Individuali-
zation explicitly addresses . . . the inapplicability of stereotypic attitudes
toward a particular defendant ....
Crocker, supra note 18, at 131-32 (quoting Schneider, Equal Rights to Trial for
Women: Sex Bias in the Law of Self-Defense, 15 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 623, 639
(1980) (quoting G. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 512 (1978))).
2 A self-defense claim based on an understanding of the dynamics of family vio-
lence is not a request for special treatment, but is merely the defendant's assertion of
her right to "equal and individualized treatment under the law." Rodwan, supra note
26, at 64; see also Jahnke v. State, 682 P.2d 991, 1036 (Wyo. 1984) (Rose, J., dissent-
ing) (explaining that the defense's offer of information on the "battered-person syn-
drome" was related to her claim of self-defense and was not an attempt to establish a
"special justification for patricide").
" See, e.g., FED. R. EvID. 402 (stating that all relevant evidence is admissible
unless excepted by some other law or rule); see also MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE,
supra note 12, § 185, at 541 (stating that relevant evidence, which must be material
and have probative value, is generally admissible).
4 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 12, § 13, at 33.
3 See id.
38 See United States v. Dyas, 376 A.2d 827, 832 (D.C.), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
973 (1977).
11 FED. R. EVID. 702.
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women who kill.3" Since 1979, expert testimony of this kind has been
admitted with increasing frequency. 9
A finding by the judge or jury that the defendant was affected by
her past history of abuse does not end the inquiry. This information
merely helps the jury interpret how the defendant might have perceived
and responded to threats of imminent danger."' It remains for the jury
to decide "whether or not, as a battered person, the defendant behaved
reasonably in the self-defense context."'
Unfortunately, acceptance of the need to educate the judge and
jury about the effects of a history of violence has been misperceived by
some as the adoption of a moral right to kill.42 At times, prosecutors
will intentionally encourage these mistaken assumptions in order to ar-
gue that jurors who are influenced by such theories, and thus vote to
acquit the defendant, encourage and support her license to kill. 3
" See Coffee, A Trend Emerges: A State Survey on the Admissibility of Expert
Testimony Concerning the Battered Woman's Syndrome, 25 J. FAM. L. 373, 373-96
(1986) (discussing the approaches of seven states that have allowed expert testimony on
the battered woman's syndrome); Crocker, supra note 18, at 138 n.77 (listing state
court cases that have considered the admissibility of expert testimony on the battered
woman's syndrome); Schneider, supra note 5, at 196-97 nn.6, 7 & 10 (listing state
court cases that have considered the admissibility of expert testimony on the battered
woman's syndrome).
" See Blackman, supra note 18, at 227; supra note 13 and accompanying text.
40 See Jahnke v. State, 682 P.2d 991, 1043 (Wyo. 1984) (Rose, J., dissenting).
41 Id. (Rose, J., dissenting).
42 A battered person's self-defense claim "does not create a right to kill because of
past mistreatment; it provides a framework for understanding why the abused [person]
found it impossible to survive without killing." Rodwan, supra note 26, at 64; see also
Blackman, supra note 18, at 230 (denouncing the equation of self-defense claims for
battered persons with arguments that killing is morally justified).
"' Prosecutors may adopt trial strategies that equate acquittal of the defendant
with "the frightening idea that one person is entitled to take the life of another. [Then,
a]s a practical matter, the burden of proof shifts to the defendant to prove that the
killing was a necessary act of self-defense." Jurywork, supra note 7, at 224; see also,
e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae, Center for Women's Rights, Inc., at 6, People v. Emick,
103 A.D.2d 643, 481 N.Y.S.2d 552 (1984) (No. 83-028) (describing how the prosecu-
tor, in a homicide trial during which expert testimony on the battered woman's syn-
drome was introduced to support a claim of self-defense, stated to the jury that "the
law is our guarantee against tyranny of individuals making their own choice").
A related argument is that our society encourages acceptance of a moral right to
kill. See Jahnke v. State, 682 P.2d 991, 1009 (Wyo. 1984) (Brown, J., concurring).
Many in our society are fascinated by violence. We make folk heroes out
of our criminals. Ballads and odes are written about murders. The more
bizarre or unusual the murder, the greater the proliferation of songs,
poems and books. The public's thirst for this sort of literature will not be
stilled. If a person wants to become famous and even wealthy, he just
needs to commit a grotesque crime.
Id. at 1010 (Brown, J., concurring). These arguments also have been made on an
academic level. See, e.g., Rittenmeyer, Of Battered Wives, Self-Defense and Double
Standards of Justice, 9 J. CRIM. JUsT. 389, 390 (1981) (arguing that admitting evi-
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An attorney presenting a child abuse-parricide defendant's self-de-
fense claim must have an informed understanding of her client's history
of abuse."' A self-defense theory that allows a judge or jury to conclude
that the defendant acted reasonably must educate the decisionmaker
about the defendant's state of mind and behavior at the time of the
killing.45 Because many victims of abuse kill their abusers when they
are not being assaulted, experts on intrafamily violence are necessary to
"illuminate the psychological bases for a sense of immediacy and life-
threatening risk, even under such conditions."4
Unfortunately, expert testimony intended to instruct the court on
the reasonableness of the battered defendant's actions is frequently mis-
understood.47 These misperceptions may begin with the initial determi-
nation of the admissibility of such testimony. Cases that have explored
the admissibility of expert testimony on the battered woman's syndrome
frequently demonstrate that the focus shifts from an inquiry regarding
the relevance of the evidence to a determination of the ultimate issue:
the reasonableness of the defendant's actions.4 Thus, this testimony
often is excluded because the court views the act as unreasonable.49
Similar misperceptions may occur when judges instruct juries on the
purpose of expert testimony."
dence regarding the battered woman's syndrome in self-defense claims is like granting a
license to kill).
"' See Blackman, supra note 18, at 231; cf. Jurywork, supra note 7, at 225 ("To
fully understand the particular situation of a defendant who has been in a battering
relationship, the attorney and members of the legal team must understand the nature of
these relationships in general.").
"I SeeJurywork, supra note 7, at 232. Some researchers have argued that battered
persons "develop a continuum along which they can 'rate' the tolerability or
survivability of episodes of ... violence. . . .[This] characteristic reflects an enhanced
capacity, an affirmation of the reasonableness of the need to act." Blackman, supra
note 18, at 229.
e Blackman, supra note 18, at 231.
4 When the entire purpose of the admission of essential expert testimony is mis-
understood, it may actually do more harm than good to both the individual defendant,
see supra notes 42-43 (discussing the misperception of expert testimony on battering as
supporting a moral right to kill), and the general level of comprehension of the role of
such information, see, e.g., Schneider, supra note 5, at 197-99 (discussing how misun-
derstood expert testimony on the battered woman's syndrome may actually perpetuate
the stereotypes of female incapacity that it was intended to dispel).
48 See Crocker, supra note 18, at 138 (stating that often "the decision to admit or
exclude the testimony is based on an assessment of the reasonableness of the defendant's
actions, rather than on the traditional test for admissibility of expert testimony").
* See id. at 138-39.
For example,
[t]he jury is told to evaluate the defendant's life, not the reasonableness of
her act of self-defense. The debate becomes whether the defendant is enti-
tled to claim she defended herself, not whether she was reasonable to do
SO.
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The perceptions and responses of a battered person can be under-
stood only within the context of her unique situation.51 Self-defense
claims for battered children frequently must include expert testimony to
explain "why they acted in self-defense after a 'reasonable man' would
have cooled off or before he would have acted."'52 When courts bar this
testimony, they fail to provide an adequate forum for battered persons
to develop a meaningful defense.
II. CASE STUDIES OF CHILD ABUSE-PARRICIDE DEFENDANTS
Several recent cases of parricide highlight the connection between
family violence and homicide. In each of these cases, the child defend-
ant had been the victim of repeated physical and/or sexual assaults.
Therefore, each was extremely familiar with the behavior of the bat-
terer and attuned to any changes in the abuse. These stories demon-
strate both common patterns of violence and distinctions between fami-
lies. The first three case studies, presented in chronological order,
demonstrate the types of legal hurdles that confront the child abuse-
parricide defendant. The final two cases represent recent partial suc-
cesses in the courts. Viewed together, these cases appear to illustrate a
judicial trend toward greater acceptance of a "battered-child" defense.
A. Richard
On the night of November 16, 1982, in Cheyenne, Wyoming,
Richard Jahnke, Sr. stepped out of his car and into the range of the 12-
gauge shotgun held by his sixteen-year-old son.53 Richard, Jr. fired six
times; four of his shots hit his father in the chest."' Inside the house, his
seventeen-year-old sister Deborah waited in the living room with a
semiautomatic .30 caliber M-1 carbine.55 She did not have to shoot.
One hour after the shooting, 6 Richard Jahnke, Sr. died from the gun-
This approach misperceives not only the purpose of [expert] testi-
mony, but also existing legal doctrine.
Id. at 149.
"' See, e.g., Blackman, supra note 18, at 228 (describing how a history of abuse
will heighten the battered person's ability to perceive the potential dangerousness of her
abuser).
52 Crocker, supra note 18, at 41.
5 See G. MORRIS, THE KIDS NEXT DOOR: SONS AND DAUGHTERS WHO KILL
THEIR PARENTS 118 (1985) [hereinafter THE KIDS NEXT DOOR].
5' See id.
5 See Jahnke v. State, 682 P.2d 991, 995 (Wyo. 1984); THE KIDS NEXT DOOR,
supra note 53, at 117.
" See Jahnke, 682 P.2d at 995.
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shot wounds inflicted by his son.5"
Richard was charged with first degree murder58 and with conspir-
ing with his sister Deborah to commit first degree murder.59 At trial,
the children relied on the defense that they had been protecting them-
selves from abusive acts by their father.60 Richard Jahnke testified
about years of violent abuse. He told the jury that his father had been
beating his mother and him and sexually abusing and beating his sister
for as long as he could remember.61 Richard and Deborah testified to
repeated unsuccessful attempts to obtain help from local child protec-
tion agencies.62 Richard's attorney also attempted to have a forensic
psychiatrist testify to the effects of this history of abuse on Richard's
perception of danger on the night of the killing.63 The trial court, how-
ever, excluded this testimony.64 The jury found Richard guilty of first
degree manslaughter and sentenced him to five to fifteen years in
prison.6 5
On appeal, Richard challenged the trial court's exclusion of the
expert testimony." The Supreme Court of Wyoming affirmed the trial
court's ruling. 7 The court began its analysis of the self-defense issue by
stating that the only admissible evidence pertaining to self-defense was
"'evidence which establishes that defendant had a bona-fide belief [he]
was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm, and that the
17 See id. at 996.
11 See id. at 1008; see also Wyo. STAT. § 6-2-101(a) (1977) ("Whoever pur-
posely and with premeditated malice ... kills any human being is guilty of murder in
the first degree.").
11 SeeJahnke, 682 P.2d at 1008; see also Wyo. STAT. § 6-1-303(a) (1977) ("A
person is guilty of conspiracy to commit a crime if he agrees with one (1) or more
persons that they or one (1) or more of them will commit a crime and one (1) or more
of them does an overt act to effect the objective of the agreement.").
60 See R. GELLES & M. STRAUS, INTIMATE VIOLENCE 127 (1988) [hereinafter
INTIMATE VIOLENCE].
61 See THE KIDS NEXT DOOR, supra note 53, at 118.
62 See INTIMATE VIOLENCE, supra note 60, at 127.
63 See Jahnke v. State, 682 P.2d 991, 1004-08 (Wyo. 1984).
6' See id.
65 See id. at 991.
6 See id. Jahnke also claimed that voir dire had been improperly limited. See id.
at 993. His claim that the lower court improperly excluded the testimony of the foren-
sic psychiatrist, however, is what is relevant to this Comment.
6 See id. at 991.
Richard's sister Deborah was convicted of aiding and abetting voluntary man-
slaughter and sentenced to three to eight years in prison. See Jahnke Conviction Up-
held: Governor Next Stop for Deborah's Attorney, Denver Post, Dec. 13, 1984, at 1-A,
col. 2, 1-A, col. 2. Five days after the Supreme Court of Wyoming upheld her convic-
tion and sentence, however, Governor Hershler commuted her sentence. See Meyers,
DeborahJahnke is Set Free, Denver Post, Dec. 18, 1984, at 1-A, col. 1, 1-A, col. 1. He
then ordered that she be placed on probation for a year following 30 days of intensive
psychiatric evaluation. See id.
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only means of escape from such danger was through the use of deadly
force.' "6 According to the majority, this standard had not been met."9
The court concluded that
[a]bsent a showing of the circumstances involving an actual
or threatened assault by the deceased upon the appellant, the
reasonableness of appellant's conduct at the time was not an
issue in the case, and the trial court, at the time it made its
ruling, properly excluded the hearsay testimony sought to be
elicited from the forensic psychiatrist."
The court also acknowledged the trial court's concern with the suffi-
ciency of the state of scientific knowledge regarding the "battered-child
syndrome."
7
Two justices dissented. 2 Justice Rose concluded that exclusion of
the expert testimony denied the defendant an opportunity to present a
defense. According to his dissent, this was not the "ordinary self-de-
fense fact situation ' 73 in which
the lay juror is able to place him or herself at the scene and
in the shoes of the accused and decide whether or not it was
reasonable for the defendant to believe that he would be
killed or receive serious bodily harm unless he resorted to the
use of deadly force.
7 4
In this case, there was a "battering and brutalizing factor . . . which
68 Jahnke, 682 P.2d at 1006 (quoting State v. Thomas, 66 Ohio St. 2d 518, 520,
423 N.E.2d 137, 139 (1981)).
69 "This record contained no evidence that the appellant was under either actual
or threatened assault by his father at the time of the shooting. Reliance upon the justifi-
cation of self-defense requires a showing of an actual or threatened imminent attack by
the deceased." Id.
70 Id. at 1007.
1 See id. at 1007-08.
72 See id. at 1011 (Rose, J., dissenting, joined by Cardine, J.); id. at 1044
(Cardine, J., dissenting, joined by Rose, J.).
" Id. at 1013 (Rose, J., dissenting).
7" Id. at 1014 (Rose, J., dissenting). According to Justice Rose,
[iut is my position that, since the issue of self-defense in the unusual be-
havioral circumstances of this case is a subject which is cloaked in the
abstract mysteries of professional knowledge, the jury, deprived of an ex-
pert's explanation of how battered people perceive and respond to the im-
minence of danger, could not be expected to and did not understand and
quantify the impact and residuals of the years and years of battering
which had been the lifelong fate of Richard Jahnke. The jury could,
therefore, not know-or be expected to know-whether his acts, at the
time and place in question here, were those of the reasonable person simi-
larly situated for whom the law of self-defense provides comfort.
Id. at 1012 (Rose, J., dissenting).
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the defense urges is causally connected with the reasonableness of Rich-
ard Jahnke's conduct. . . [and therefore] the jury was confronted with
an unusual self-defense fact situation characterized by a psychiatric
overlay.""7
Richard's case is instructive because the court examined the role of
expert testimony in self-defense cases involving child abuse-parricide
defendants. Two justices of the Supreme Court of Wyoming believed
that exclusion of the expert testimony denied the jury the opportunity
to hear that the defendant's behavior was that of a "battered individual
whose consequent perception of the imminence of danger is different
from the perception of the nonbrutalized person and . . how the bat-
tered person responds to danger." 76
B. Dawn
When Dawn Maria Cruickshank's parents were separated, she
and her sister Theresa pleaded with the lawyers to prevent their father
from visiting them. 7 Despite their efforts, he was granted limited visi-
tation rights."8 The court recognized, however, the tension that existed
between G. Alan Cruickshank and his estranged wife, and it restricted
his visits with their daughters to Monday nights from 7:00 P.M. until
8:00 P.M." These visits were confined to the garage of the upstate New
York home that the girls shared with their mother.8" On the evening of
Monday, November 15, 1982, Mr. Cruickshank arrived for one of his
visits to find only his daughter Dawn at home. l According to Dawn,
her father told her that he "was going into the basement because he
was cold."8 2 This led to an argument between Dawn and her father.8"
Dawn later said that "she did not want her father to go into the base-
ment and that she told him he was not supposed to do so." ' Dawn's
71 Id. at 1014 (Rose, J., dissenting).
71 Id. at 1017 (Rose, J., dissenting); see also supra notes 11-14 and accompany-
ing text (discussing the importance of expert testimony to self-defense cases that involve
a history of abuse).
7 See THE KIDs NEXT DOOR, supra note 53, at 106.
78 See id.
71 See People v. Cruickshank, 105 A.D.2d 325, 327, 484 N.Y.S.2d 328, 331
(1985).
80 See id.
8' See id.
82 Id. at 327, 484 N.Y.S.2d at 332.
11 As Dawn described the argument to a police deputy: "He said he was cold and
he was tired of seeing my sister and I in the garage, and he said he was going to go in
the house and I told him I didn't want him in the house." THE KIDS NEXT DOOR,
supra note 53, at 108.
84 Cruickshank, 105 A.D.2d at 327, 484 N.Y.S.2d at 332.
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father then grabbed her, but she "pulled away and ran back into the
house. . . . She then took a .22 caliber rifle from under her bed,
loaded it and returned to the garage."' 85 Dawn could not recall how
many times she fired the rifle, but evidence introduced during her trial
established that she fired eleven times, with nine bullets striking her
father in the back of the head. 6 Dawn then put down the rifle and
returned to the house to call the police.
87
Dawn was charged with second degree murder.88 At trial, Dawn
testified to numerous sexual assaults by her father.89 She told the jury
"that she feared her father would sexually abuse her on the night of the
shooting." 90 Ms. Cruickshank's attorneys argued, among other things,
that she had killed her father in self-defense. 1 "She had been repeat-
edly raped by her father, and the night she shot him she believed he
was about to attack her again."92
The jury was charged on second degree murder.93 It was in-
structed on the defense of justification in order to prevent rape and on
the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance, which, if es-
tablished by the evidence, would reduce second degree murder to first
degree manslaughter.9 4 The jury accepted the affirmative defense, find-
ing Dawn guilty of the murder, but reducing the charge to first degree
manslaughter.95 During the "sentencing proceedings, the trial judge de-
nied the defense's request that Dawn be granted youthful offender sta-
tus and sentenced her to two and one-third to seven years in prison.96
The appellate court reversed the trial court's denial of youthful
offender status.97 In reversing, the court explicitly recognized that
85 Id.
s See id.
87 See id.
88 See id.
89 See id. at 328, 484 N.Y.S.2d at 332. This testimony was corroborated by a
police investigator. See id.
"0 Id. Under New York law, a person may use deadly physical force against an-
other when she "reasonably believes that such other person is committing or attempting
to commit a ... forcible rape, [or] forcible sodomy." N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.15 2(b)
(McKinney 1987).
91 See Cruickshank, 105 A.D.2d at 328, 484 N.Y.S.2d at 332.
82 THE KIDs NEXT DOOR, supra note 53, at 114.
The prosecutor's strategy was to contend that "Dawn had ambushed her father at
the garage when he came to see her that night. The motive: hate building up from the
pressure of a tumultuous divorce and property settlement." Id.; cf. supra notes 42-43
and accompanying text (describing attempts by prosecutors to characterize self-defense
claims raised by battered children and women as assertions of a moral right to kill).
9 See Cruickshank, 105 A.D.2d at 328, 484 N.Y.S.2d at 332.
84 See id.
9 See id.
88 See id.
87 See id. at 335, 484 N.Y.S.2d at 337. Under New York law, this decision va-
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Dawn's history of abuse was causally connected to her act of parri-
cide. 8 In addition, the court noted the presence of characteristics com-
mon among sexually abused children. Presiding Judge Mahoney de-
scribed Dawn's "conduct and symptoms . . [as] classic characteristics
of a sexually abused child."99 He reasoned that, because the only proof
offered in support of Dawn's self-defense claim was her knowledge,
based upon her history of sexual abuse, of her father's capacity for vio-
lence, the jury must have relied upon this information when it made
the determination that "she [had] acted under the influence of extreme
emotional disturbance for which there was a reasonable explanation or
excuse."
100
Despite Dawn's conviction for the murder of her father, her case,
like Richard Jahnke's, provides indications of developing judicial recog-
nition of the link between child abuse and parricide. The appellate
court recognized that much of Dawn's behavior was typical of a sexu-
ally abused child and that'there was a direct causal connection between
that abuse and the killing of her father.
C. Cheryl
On February 5, 1987, Cheryl Pierson 01 discovered her father's
body lying in a pool of blood on the driveway in front of her house.,
0 2
She realized that he had been shot and knew that Sean Pica, the high
school classmate she had hired to kill her father for $1000, had done
cates Dawn's manslaughter conviction and substitutes a youthful offender adjudication
that "is not a judgment of conviction for a crime or any other offense." N.Y. GRIM.
PROC. LAW § 720.35 (McKinney 1984).
The court concluded that "while we do not necessarily feel that the trial court
abused its discretion in denying youthful offender treatment, we choose to exercise our
discretion." Id. Despite this cautious language, it is clear that, by substituting its own
determination of the defendant as a youthful offender, the court in fact concluded that
the trial court had abused its discretion in denying the defendant youthful offender
status.
" Presiding Judge Mahoney, writing for the majority, based the decision to re-
verse on the "significant mitigating circumstances that defendant is a sexually abused
child and that the crime of which she was convicted arose out of that fact." Id. at 334,
484 N.Y.S.2d at 337.
99 Id.
100 Id. at 335, 484 N.Y.S.2d at 337.
101 Cheryl Pierson was 16 years old at the time of the murder. See Kleiman, Un-
cle Testifies that He Heard of Abuse of Girl, N.Y. Times, Sept. 18, 1987, at B1, col. 2,
B5, col. 1 [hereinafter Kleiman, Uncle]. This case is the subject of a new book. See D.
KLEIMAN, A DEADLY SILENCE, THE ORDEAL OF CHERYL PIERSON: A CASE OF IN-
CEST AND MURDER (1988).
102 See Kleiman, Girl Tells How She and Friend Planned Killing of Her Father,
N.Y. Times, Sept. 17, 1987, at B2, col. 5, B2, col. 5 [hereinafter Kleiman, Girl]; Klei-
man, Girl Says Hiring Father's Killer Seemed 'Like a Game' at First, N.Y. Times,
Sept. 15, 1987, at B1, col. 2, BI, col. 3 [hereinafter Kleiman, Game].
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his job. 03
Cheryl Pierson pled guilty to manslaughter.104 At sentencing,
Cheryl testified that she had often been forced to have sexual relations
with her father. The sexual abuse began when she was twelve years
old.'0 5 When questioned by her attorney about the frequency of her
father's assaults during the two months during which Cheryl had
planned her father's murder, she told the court that she and her father
were having " '[s]exual intercourse. . . . [t]wo to three times a
day.' "08 Cheryl testified that, although she realized that her father's
behavior towards her was wrong, she "acquiesced so he would not take
his frustrations out on the rest of the family."' 0 She stated that she
arranged to kill her father because she believed he would start to sexu-
ally abuse her seven year old sister JoAnn.'08
Cheryl's attorney presented the testimony of an expert witness on
child abuse: Dr. Jean Goodwin, a professor of psychiatry at the Medi-
cal College of Wisconsin and a nationally recognized authority on sex-
ual abuse.'0 9 Dr. Goodwin testified that Cheryl was "definitely a vic-
tim of sexual abuse and, as such, suffered from 'post traumatic stress
syndrome.' "110 When Cheryl described the planning of her father's
murder with classmate Sean Pica as something that " 'didn't seem seri-
103 See Kleiman, Game, supra note 102, at BI, col. 3.
104 See Kleiman, Girl, supra note 102, at B2, col. 5. The New York manslaughter
provisions are codified at N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.20 (McKinney 1987) (first degree)
and id. § 125.15 (second degree).
105 See Kleiman, Game, supra note 102, at BI, col. 2. Cheryl's lack of resistance
appears characteristic of incest victims. See infra notes 155-58 and accompanying text
(describing the difficulty that incest victims have in refusing to acquiesce to the sexual
assaults of their parents). During the proceedings, neighbors and friends testified that
they had suspected for years that James Pierson had been sexually abusing his daugh-
ter. See Kleiman, Neighbors and Friends of Abused Teen-Ager Tell of Their Silence,
N.Y. Times, Sept. 14, 1987, at B7, col. 3, B7, col. 3 [hereinafter Kleiman, Neighbors].
None of the people who testified, however, had ever confronted Mr. Pierson or sought
help from social service agencies or the police. See id.; cf. infra notes 131-142 (discuss-
ing child abuse, family privacy, and the reluctance of others to intrude upon what they
see as a family matter).
1I Kleiman, Uncle, supra note 101, at B5, col. 1.
10. Kleiman, Game, supra note 102, at B2, col. 6. James Pierson's repeated inces-
tuous assaults on his daughter created and perpetuated a threatening situation for his
daughter Cheryl. See infra notes 154-58 and accompanying text (discussing the implic-
itly threatening nature of sexual abuse of children).
108 See Kleiman, Game, supra note 102, at B2, col. 6.
109 See id. By offering expert testimony on the effects of a history of sexual as-
sault, Cheryl's attorney recognized the need to place Cheryl's decision to arrange for
her father's killing in the context of her unique situation. See supra notes 11-14
(describing the importance of educating the trier of fact about the effects of battering).
1 Kleiman, Game, supra note 102, at B2, col. 6. According to Dr. Goodwin, this
condition sometimes made it difficult for Cheryl to distinguish reality from her fantasy
world. See id. She described this fantasy world as a part of the process of coping with
the sexual abuse. See id.
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ous. . . [and] was more like a game,'" she was accurately depicting an
event that was more a part of her fantasy life than reality."' The plan-
ning of the murder "'made her feel better.' "112 When Cheryl's attor-
ney asked Dr. Goodwin whether Cheryl could be considered to be
"'the engineer of this crime,' "I"' her response was that accusing
Cheryl of this role was to "'misunderstand her basic sense of unreal-
ity.' "" On October 5, 1987, Cheryl Pierson was sentenced to six
months in jail.
Because Cheryl Pierson pled guilty to manslaughter, she did not
need to develop a self-defense claim. 1 At her sentencing hearing, how-
ever, her attorney introduced extensive evidence of Cheryl's long history
of abuse and connected that abuse, through the use of expert testimony,
to Cheryl's planning and ultimate hiring of her father's killer. This
case differs from the typical parricide scenario in at least two respects.
First, Cheryl did not kill her father herself. Second, the expert testi-
mony presented in this case would have supported a diminished capac-
ity-type defense rather than self-defense."' Despite these distinctions,
this case illustrates a growing judicial acceptance of expert testimony
that attempts to link the perceptions and behavior of the abused child to
the killing of her abusing parent.
D. Johnny and Joeri
In each case discussed above, the child abuse-parricide defendant
confronted judicial obstacles and ambivalence. Two recent cases indi-
cate that this ambivalence may eventually develop into a greater accept-
ance of self-defense claims for battered children who kill their abusers.
These cases, the first involving attempted murder and the second the
killing of a legal guardian, demonstrate growing judicial receptivity to
self-defense claims related to child abuse.
Sociz "Johnny" Junatanov tried very hard to kill his father." 7 He
... Id. at B1, col. 2 (quoting testimony of Cheryl Pierson).
112 Id. at B2, col. 6 (quoting testimony of Dr. Jean Goodwin).
113 Id. (quoting Paul Gianelli, the attorney for Cheryl Pierson).
114 Id. (quoting testimony of Dr. Jean Goodwin).
110 The facts of Cheryl's case clearly negate the use of a self-defense strategy. She
was not the murderer and she was not in the vicinity of the murder. See supra notes 6-
18 and accompanying text (discussing self-defense standards).
116 For a discussion of the diminished capacity, or partial responsibility, defense in
manslaughter cases, see W. LAFAVE & A. ScorT, supra note 6, § 4.7(b)(2).
117 See Chambers, supra note 2, at 38, col. 3.
Mr. Junatanov hired a man to kill his father, Albert, a Hollywood restau-
rateur, according to court testimony. The father was stabbed, but he lived.
Then the girlfriend of the man hired to kill the older Mr. Junatanov
dressed as a nurse and injected the father with sulfuric acid while he was
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was unsuccessful and was finally arrested and charged with attempted
murder."' 8 During the trial, the jurors learned that, from early child-
hood, the defendant's father had "kept him in handcuffs and chained
him. . .[and] when he was a teenager his father raped him."1 19 In the
spring of 1986, after six weeks of testimony, the jury found him not
guilty." z Johnny's acquittal "might be the first not guilty verdict in
which a child was found to have acted in self-defense against a brutal
parent."12'
After convicting Joeri DeBeer of manslaughter for the killing of
his legal guardian, the jury asked the judge for leniency in his sentenc-
ing."' He was sentenced to three years probation and fined $1,000.123
Ten of the twelve jurors who had convicted DeBeer testified on his
behalf during the sentencing proceedings." "They said they realized
he was a 'normal' and 'obedient' young man 'already punished enough'
and driven to murder by four years of nearly daily sexual abuse at the
hands of his adoptive father, a convicted child molester."' 25 The sen-
tencing judge stated that he felt confident that DeBeer knew the killing
was wrong and would not pose a danger to society.
12 6
in a hospital bed, the jury was told. He survived.
His son then promised $5,000 to another man, who agreed to shoot
Albert Junatanov. The man hired for the job turned out to be an under-
cover police officer.
Id.
118 See id.
119 Id.
120 See Blodgett, supra note 2, at 36; Chambers, supra note 2, at 38, col. 3.
121 Chambers, supra note 2, at 38, col. 3.
122 See id. at 38, col. 4.
The jury heard testimony that the young man's legal guardian, Philip
Parsons, a convicted child molester, had been sexually abusing him four or
five times a week for four years.
The jurors, without knowing others had the same idea, visited the
young man in jail. All but one of the jurors wrote letters to the judge
asking leniency for Mr. DeBeer. Several started a college trust fund for
the young man and others gave him gifts.
Id.
123 See Abused Teen Gets Probation, Not Jail for Killing Father, L.A. Daily J.,
June 23, 1986, at 1, col. 4, 1, col. 4.
124 See id.
125 Id.
126 See id.
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III. CHILD ABUSE
"Speak roughly to your little boy,
And beat him when he sneezes:
He only does it to annoy,
Because he knows it teases."
127
When abused children respond to their abusers with violence, in-
terpretation of their reactions requires a preliminary understanding of
child abuse and the violent family. Familiarity with the individual situ-
ation, in light of general information regarding the dynamics of the
abusive family, places the specific act within the proper perspective.1 28
Although the need to understand the psychological and social effect of
intrafamily abuse is increasingly recognized when battered women kill
their battering mates,129 this position has not been as widely accepted
when a child murders an abusive parent.13
The following Sections will explore the general characteristics of
child abuse and efforts to develop a profile of the abusive home. The
psychological, social, and legal theories discussed in this Part should be
read with the Part II case studies in mind. Researchers have achieved a
sophisticated understanding of the dynamics of family violence. This
information is essential to an evaluation of the reasonableness of the
actions of the battered child. Excluding testimony on the effects of in-
trafamily violence denies the abused child a meaningful self-defense
claim.
A. Exploring the Dynamics of Child Abuse
In the early 1960s, the term "child abuse" was developed to de-
scribe an emerging problem in American society. 31 Since that time, the
use of physical punishment to discipline children has become a matter
127 L. CARROLL, ALICE'S ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND 83 (Modern Library
ed. 1920) (1865).
128 See infra notes 160-75 and accompanying text (discussing research into child
abuse and the families in which it takes place).
129 See Blackman, supra note 18, at 227 (describing a "national trend" in favor of
admission of expert testimony in cases in which battered women kill their abusers);
supra note 5 and accompanying text (discussing the recognition of the battered wo-
man's syndrome); cf. Schneider, supra note 5, at 197 n.10 (listing homicide cases in
which expert testimony on the effect of battering on adult women defendants was
admitted).
120 See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text (comparing the increased ac-
ceptance of self-defense claims based on the battered woman's syndrome with the gen-
eral reluctance to accept similar claims from battered children).
131 See BEHIND CLOSED DOORS, supra note 9, at 7. This does not mean, how-
ever, that child abuse is a new problem. See infra note 132 and accompanying text.
19891
1300 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
of public and professional concern and a topic of general discussion and
debate. During the past 25 years, the traditional belief that physical
force is not only the parents' right,1"2 but is in the best interest of the
child, has been challenged on both psychological 3 3 and legal 3 .
grounds. By the end of the 1960s, all fifty states had enacted child
abuse statutes.13 5 These laws clearly prevent a parent from inflicting
severe or deadly harm. The parameters of "abuse" remain vague, how-
ever, and specific guidelines for lawful behavior have not been ade-
quately defined." 6
Child abuse is a hidden problem. Many cases of child abuse are
not reported.1 3 7 The underreporting of child abuse may be caused by
different factors. In the majority of violent families, child abuse is not
considered taboo or wrong; instead, it is "an accepted and integral part
of the way the family functions."' Because child abuse has no precise
legal or social definition, 3 ' many people who are concerned about a
parent's behavior may not be certain that particular acts constitute
abuse.'40 The abused children themselves frequently are reluctant to
report the violent incidents.1 41 Finally, child abuse, especially the severe
132 Child abuse is a longstanding tradition deeply rooted in history. See BEHIND
CLOSED DOORS, supra note 9, at 7 ("The historical record demonstrates a use of ex-
tensive and often lethal forms of violence by parents. Those who have examined the
history of child abuse ... document a history of violence and infanticide dating back to
biblical times."); Radbill, Children in a World of Violence: A History of Child Abuse,
in THE BATTERED CHILD, supra note 19, at 3, 3-20 (documenting the cross-cultural
history of child abuse). This tradition has been reinforced by traditional fables and
myths. See BEHIND CLOSED DOORS, supra note 9, at 51-52 (illustrating how myths
and fairy tales condone and even support adults' "corrective" violence towards chil-
dren). These myths continually remind us that parents have the right to use violence
against their children.
133 See Kempe, Silverman, Steele, Droegemueller & Silver, The Battered Child
Syndrome, 181 J. AM. MED. A. 17, 18-20 (1962) (describing the psychological harm
caused by child abuse).
1-4 See BEHIND CLOSED DOORS, supra note 9, at 9 (stating that all 50 states have
laws that mandate the reporting of child abuse and neglect).
'35 See id. The effectiveness of such statutory provisions, however, has been ques-
tioned. See, e.g., Radbill, supra note 132, at 13 (documenting the continued abuse of
children by parents despite the fact that protective services for children have a long
history, beginning in Mesopotamia six thousand years ago).
138 See BEHIND CLOSED DooRs, supra note 9, at 52.
s See R. KEMPE & C. KEMPE, THE COMMON SECRET: SEXUAL ABUSE OF
CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS 14 (1984) [hereinafter THE COMMON SECRET].
13I Id. at 4; see also INTIMATE VIOLENCE, supra note 60, at 53 ("[S]panking
children is about as common, and viewed as equally normal, as Pampers.").
139 See INTIMATE VIOLENCE, supra note 60, at 57.
140 See BEHIND CLOSED DOORS, supra note 9, at 14-15; see also Kleiman, Neigh-
bors, supra note 105, at B7, col. 2. (describing how Cheryl Pierson's friends and neigh-
bors had long suspected that she was being sexually assaulted by her father, but had
not reported the abuse).
"" The Supreme Court recently recognized how difficult it is for battered children
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or sexual abuse of children, creates social dissonance because it conflicts
with basic standards and values that define parents' obligations to love
and care for their children."42
Children may be abused in many different ways.14 3 Although the
frequency and severity of physical attacks may vary, the psychological
and emotional abuse is often constant.' The assumption that relatively
infrequent or milder forms of battering will have little or no effect on
the child's development is inaccurate.145 Even in those homes in which
the physical battering is less severe, family violence has some effect on
the child.
146
The most secret form of intrafamily violence is the sexual abuse of
children.1 47 Sexual abuse has always been the least frequently reported
form of child abuse.'14 There are indications, however, that a recent
to seek outside support. See Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 60 (1987) ("A child's
feelings of vulnerability and guilt, and his or her unwillingness to come forward are
particularly acute when the abuser is a parent.").
142 See Korbin, supra note 19, at 23 (asserting that evidence of child abuse in the
United States, while abundant, runs counter to the basic societal premise that "human
nature compels parents to rear their young with solicitousness and concern, good inten-
tions, and tender loving care").
143 See Radbill, supra note 132, at 3.
1I See Steele, Psychodynamic Factors in Child Abuse, in THE BATTERED CHILD,
supra note 19, at 81, 89; see also INTIMATE VIOLENCE, supra note 60, at 68 (discuss-
ing examples of emotional abuse of children).
145 Child abuse need not involve excessive violence or sexual assault to affect the
emotional and psychological development of the child. Parents' actions against their
children have a strong influence because of the nature of the parent-child relationship.
"Children are dependent upon adults: first, for their survival; then for affection, and
attention, and an understanding of what the world in which they live is all about."
Bass, In the Truth Itself There is Healing, Introduction to I NEVER TOLD ANYONE:
WRITINGS BY WOMEN SURVIVORS OF CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE 23, 26-27 (E. Bass & L.
Thornton eds. 1983) [hereinafter I NEVER TOLD ANYONE].
146 See INTIMATE VIOLENCE, supra note 60, at 121-23; see also id. at 56
(describing how parents can inflict "cruel and harsh treatment on their children with-
out necessarily producing a diagnosable clinical condition"). Furthermore, violence
against children tends to perpetuate itself. See BEHIND CLOSED DOORS, supra note 9,
at 101-02 (describing how children from violent homes tend to perpetuate the violent
behavior when they themselves raise families); Goleman, Sad Legacy of Child Abuse:
The Search For Remedies, N.Y. Times, Jan. 24, 1989, at CI, col. 4, C1, col. 4 (citing
recent studies that indicate one-third of the people abused during childhood will become
abusers); cf. INTIMATE VIOLENCE, supra note 60, at 124 (describing research that in-
dicates that "growing up in a violent home compromises the intellectual development of
abused children").
147 See INTIMATE VIOLENCE, supra note 60, at 64-65.
148 "[Slexual abuse of children . . . has been more concealed, less reported, and
has attracted relatively little concern. . . . A taboo of dealing with the common phe-
nomenon of incest seems to have been as strong or stronger than the taboo of incest
itself." Steele, supra note 144, at 102; see also Bass, supra note 145, at 24-25 (discuss-
ing the extent of sexual abuse of children and the infrequency with which it is re-
ported); Comment, The Admissibility of Expert Testimony in Intrafamily Child Sexual
Abuse Cases, 34 UCLA L. REV. 175, 185, 187 (1986) [hereinafter Comment, The
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increase in public awareness has made child sexual abuse a matter of
growing public concern."' Sexual abuse cases, particularly incest
cases,150 are now being reported almost as often as other types of
abuse. 5 ' Despite the frequency with which it occurs,152 sexual abuse of
children often remains secret because it is more difficult to detect than
other forms of physical abuse. The overt signs of sexual abuse may be
more easily concealed from other family members, teachers, and medi-
cal professionals.' 53
The sexual abuse of children may appear less aggressive or violent
than other forms of abuse. Sexual assaults may involve little or no
physical battering, but they invariably include psychological force in
the form of emotional manipulation or coercion of the child. 5 A sexu-
ally abused child may appear to submit to the abusive parent. How-
ever, this is not a voluntary act. This behavior can usually be explained
by one or more of the following reasons:
[Sihe is afraid that if she resists, the man will hurt her or
someone else; she is afraid that if she resists the man may
say that she started it and get her in trouble; she is taken by
Admissibility of Expert Testimony] (discussing reasons why sexual abuse is not
reported).
149 See Comment, The Admissibility of Expert Testimony, supra note 148, at 175.
1.0 Although the terms "child sexual abuse" and "incest" are often used inter-
changeably, they do not have the same meaning. The National Center on Child Abuse
and Neglect clarifies this distinction through its definition of "child sexual abuse" as
"'[clontacts or interactions between a child and an adult when the child is being used
for the sexual stimulation of that adult or another person.'" Id. at 177 (quoting THE
COMMON SECRET, supra note 137, at 10). "Incest, on the other hand, refers to sexual
relations between persons so closely related that marriage is legally forbidden." Id. at
177-78.
151 See Steele, supra note 144, at 102.
152 The statistics on the frequency of sexual abuse of children vary. See, e.g., Bass,
supra note 145, at 24 ("[Olne out of four girls and one out of seven boys will be
sexually abused."); Comment, The Admissibility of Expert Testimony, supra note 148,
at 175 ("[S]tudies estimate that one of every five females and one of every eleven males
are sexually assaulted as children."); Kleiman, Neighbors, supra note 105, at B7, col. 4
(reporting the statement of Dr. Judith L. Herman, psychiatric director of the Women's
Mental Health Collective in Sommerville, Mass., that "1 to 4 percent of all women
have been sexually abused by their fathers or stepfathers"); cf. THE COMMON SECRET,
supra note 137, at 13 ("It is presently impossible to give accurate estimates of the total
incidence of sexual abuse in the United States . . .").
'" See Comment, The Admissibility of Expert Testimony, supra note 148, at 175
("There often is no physical or medical evidence of the abuse."); Kleiman, Neighbors,
supra note 105, at B7, col. 6 (reporting the acknowledgement of Karla Digirolamo,
executive director of the Governor's Commission on Domestic Violence in New York,
that "with sexual abuse-unlike other forms of physical abuse-the signs are not al-
ways clear").
154 See Bass, supra note 145, at 27; Summit, The Child Sexual Abuse Accommo-
dation Syndrome, 7 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 177, 182-83 (1983).
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surprise and has no idea what to do; the man tells her it's
okay, the man says he's teaching her, the man says every-
body does it; she has been taught to obey adults; she thinks
she has no choice."'1 5
Autobiographical reports of childhood sexual abuse inflicted by
parents often include repeated references by the parent to a shared se-
cret and parental indications that something worse than the present
sexual abuse will happen to the child if she refuses to comply or "tells"
on the sexually abusive parent.5 6 In some cases, the threats are made
explicit: the child is told clearly that she will suffer if she refuses to
allow the abusive behavior.157 Therefore, even seemingly nonviolent
sexual abuse often leaves its victims feeling hopeless and afraid, because
it incorporates a threat of imminent further and more severe abuse if
the child refuses to comply with the parent's demands. 58
Battered and sexually abused children live in a world that is strik-
ingly different from the safe and nurturing home depicted by tradi-
tional values and social expectations. Instead of being protected and
cared for, these children are "thrown into conflict, confusion, insecurity,
and anguish.' 5 9 This is the backdrop against which parricide often
occurs. Over the past 25 years, efforts to understand the dynamics of
intrafamily abuse have led to attempts to identify common characteris-
155 Bass, supra note 145, at 27.
Dr. Ronald Summit has developed the "Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syn-
drome," which classifies the typical responses of sexually abused children into five
stages: secrecy; helplessness; entrapment and accommodation; delayed, conflicted and
unconvincing disclosure; and retraction. See Summit, supra note 154, at 181. This
description of the typical reactions of sexually abused children is similar in many ways
to the battered woman's syndrome. See supra note 5.
158 See, e.g., Monroe, From California Daughterl 1950, in I NEVER TOLD ANY-
ONE, supra note 145, at 91, 93 ("His [my father's] eyes are boring into my bare
breasts. . . . 'Don't ever tell anyone, baby. They wouldn't understand, this is strictly
between us, okay?' ") This type of secrecy is described by Dr. Summit as a distinct
phase of the "Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome." See Summit, supra note
154, at 181. To the sexually abused child, the "secrecy is both the source of fear and
the promise of safety: 'Everything will be all right if you just don't tell.'" Id.
Although programs to help teach children how to refuse "sexual advances, un-
wanted touching, and other invasions of their persons" have been developed, they reach
only a limited audience and do not solve the essential problem of "the basic inequality
of power, understanding, or freedom between a child and an adult." Bass, supra note
145, at 28.
157 See Hoyal, These Are the Things I Remember, in I NEVER TOLD ANYONE,
supra note 145, at 70, 77 (" 'Don't you say anything to your mother ever. If you do,
you'll be sorrier than you've ever been in your life.' ").
158 See Comment, The Admissibility of Expert Testimony, supra note 148, at 185;
see also Bass, supra note 145, at 27-28 (describing how children generally are unable
to say no to sexual abuse even when they "desperately" want to refuse).
159 Bass, supra note 145, at 27.
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tics of both the violent family and the abused child. These findings pro-
vide essential background information in an area that often is difficult
to understand. Research in this area now enables experts to offer the
uninitiated a glimpse into the world of the abused child.
B. Developing a Profile of the Violent Home and the Battered
Child
Child abuse has been identified as "an extremely complex problem
• .. [that] has many ramifications in the fields of medicine, social
work, law, psychology, child development, psychiatry, and anthropol-
ogy."160 The physical abuse of children has been documented cross-
culturally161 and throughout world history. 62 Therefore, a profile of
the "typical" violent family would likely be both over- and underinclu-
sive. There are common characteristics of abuse, but there is no com-
plete profile of a "typical" violent family. Recent research, however,
has disclosed identifiable patterns of cause and effect for child abuse
that provide a context for interpreting the perceptions and actions of
child abuse victims. Expert witnesses capable of relating these theories
of abuse to individual family histories can help establish the essential
link between the abused child's actions and her perceptions."6
Different families experience different levels and types of stress.
By focusing on those experiences and responses common to violent fam-
ilies, however, certain characteristic patterns begin to emerge.'" Recent
efforts to understand family violence include the theory of the "symbi-
otic" relationship of abuse' and the identification of patterns based on
160 Steele, supra note 144, at 82.
181 See Korbin, supra note 19, at 23-41.
162 See Radbill, supra note 132, at 3-20.
163 See Comment, The Admissibility of Expert Testimony, supra note 148, at 180-
81. In cases of sexual abuse, expert witnesses can be used to establish characteristics
common to children who are victims of sexual abuse. See id. at 176-77. Expert testi-
mony educates the judge and the jury about the "characteristics and dynamics of child
sexual abuse." Id. at 177. Increasingly, there has been a "trend toward admitting ex-
pert testimony that describes the behavior and symptoms typically exhibited by sexually
abused children." Id.
"" Researchers have demonstrated a statistically significant correlation between
stress and child abuse. See BEHIND CLOSED DOORS, supra note 9, at 183; Straus &
Kantor, Stress and Child Abuse, in THE BATTERED CHILD, supra note 19, at 42, 50-
51.
16' Forensic psychologist Dennis Harrison, who has studied child abuse-parricide,
uses
"symbiotic" to describe a relationship in which the parent sees the child as
a mere extension, a kind of human robot directed and controlled by the
parent. . . .Symbiotic relationships . . . begin when a child is . . . "3, 4,
5 on up. . . ." A tight bond, like that between master and slave, develops.
And that closeness also involves a great deal of hostility by the child for
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'"critical stresses," which are social or economic factors or significant
events that affect the family and may increase the likelihood of child
abuse.' 6 "[I1t can be shown with statistical significance that abusive,
neglecting behavior can be precipitated or escalated by such things as
poverty, bad housing, unemployment, marital strife, alcoholism, drug
abuse . . .and a host of other things."'1 6 7 By identifying the "critical
stresses" that frequently precede or accompany family violence, re-
searchers are developing a method of isolating and understanding cer-
tain common characteristics of the abusive family.
In the same way that abusive families may share certain charac-
teristics, battered children often share similar perceptions of themselves
and their situation. Children who suffer from a history of physical
abuse frequently feel that no one cares about them and that their situa-
tion is hopeless. 68 This feeling is reinforced when, as is often the case,
a nonabusing parent refuses to intervene to protect the child during or
after beatings by the abusive parent.. 9 or when victims of sexual abuse
complain to a nonabusing parent and are told that they are "lying or
else 'making it up' to cause trouble, or that it was all their fault any-
way."'7 0 The children are left "feeling hopeless and uncared for."''"
These problems are compounded in cases of sexual abuse, which by its
the parent.
Meyer, Kids Who Kill Parents, Wash. Post, May 13, 1984, Magazine, at 14, 15-16
(quoting Dennis Harrison). According to Harrison, the symbiotic relationship also usu-
ally involves hostility from the parent.
The parent in a symbiotic relationship views the child with hatred ....
"The parents are these very angry people down deep. It's an angry thing
to do, to create dependency, control someone to that extent, take away
their individuality and never let it develop. That's an effect of their own
rage. These are rage filled people."
Id. at 16 (quoting Dennis Harrison).
16 See Steele, supra note 144, at 82 (describing critical stresses as any of a num-
ber of factors that precipitate a crisis that ends in abuse).
167 Id.; see also BEHIND CLOSED DOORS, supra note 9, at 181 (proposing to ex-
plain research findings with the theory "that stress is a major contributor to family
violence"); id. at 189 ("Couples who encounter greater than average stress are some-
what more likely to use abusive violence toward their children . . ... "); Steele, supra
note 144, at 89-94 (describing in four case studies child abuse under circumstances
including stress-producing crises).
168 See supra notes 154-58 and accompanying text (discussing the way sexual
abuse creates feelings of hopelessness in children); cf. Kleiman, Neighbors, supra note
105, at B7, col. 4 ("[R]esearchers say they are convinced that there is a link between
the high suicide rate among teen-agers today and child abuse . . .
169 See Steele, supra note 144, at 84.
170 Id.; see also Summit, supra note 154, at 181-82 ("Any attempt by the child to
'illuminate the secret [the sexual abuse] will be countered by an adult conspiracy of
silence and disbelief. . . .[A]dult expectation dominates the judgment applied to dis-
closures of sexual abuse.").
171 Steele, supra note 144, at 84.
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nature is often "carried out amid such fear, secrecy and shame that a
victim is unable to speak out and ask for help."' 2
When family violence is concealed and not reported, it is far more
difficult to aid the family or to research the abusive behavior. 1 3 De-
spite the problems of obtaining accurate quantative data on child abuse,
research does continue.174 This data helps professionals to locate and
lessen or prevent incidents of abuse,' 7" increases our general under-
standing of family aggression, and, in conjunction with expert analysis,
enables lawyers, judges, and jurors to evaluate the self-defense claims of
child abuse-parricide defendants.
CONCLUSION
Self-defense claims raised by child abuse-parricide defendants re-
quire the defendant to establish a connection between her history of
abuse and her violent response. Traditional self-defense law is premised
on isolated encounters between strangers. Therefore, labels applied in
traditional self-defense cases are not readily transferable to self defense-
parricide cases. The only way to explore the reasonableness of the
defendant's action when homicide is committed within the context of a
battering relationship is through an understanding of the common char-
acteristics of intrafamily violence. Although child abuse research and
acceptance of the battered woman's syndrome have paved the way for
this inquiry, widespread recognition of this connection in the child
abuse-parricide context has not yet been achieved.
Child abuse research and studies of battered women provide infor-
mation on the perceptions and responses characteristic of victims of
family violence. The diagnostic value of this data becomes apparent
when it is applied to individual case studies. The similarities that
emerge from studies of battered children demonstrate that an educated
understanding of the effects of abuse is essential to interpreting the
homicidal act of a battered person. In addition, these cases show recog-
172 Kleiman, Neighbors, supra note 105, at B7, col. 5.
'7 See id. at B7, cols. 4-5.
174 See, e.g., D. FINKELHOR, CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE: NEW THEORY AND RE-
SEARCH 69-220 (1984) (discussing recent research on sexual abuse of children); BE-
HIND CLOSED DOORS, supra note 9, at 60-74 (discussing a survey conducted by the
authors and results obtained by other researchers); see also THE COMMON SECRET,
supra note 137, at 4 ("In the past ten years, the plight of sexually abused children is
receiving a rather complete reevaluation."); cf. Helfer, The Developmental Basis of
Child Abuse and Neglect: An Epidemiological Approach, in THE BATTERED CHILD,
supra note 19, at 60, 60-66 (discussing classification, compilation, and application of
accurate data on child abuse in the context of an epidemiological approach to the
problem).
"' See Steele, supra note 144, at 89.
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nition by both the courts1"6 and the general public1" of the complex
issues raised by the abused child who kills her battering parent and
claims self-defense.
To recognize the common characteristics of abused children and
violent homes is to begin to comprehend a complex and unique pattern
of behavior. Adequate representation of child abuse-parricide defend-
ants requires that this behavior be examined in the proper context. Al-
lowing these defendants to develop their claims of self-defense merely
affirms their right to fair legal treatment. It does not grant them addi-
tional privileges, nor does it, or can it, compensate them for what they
have already lost.
17 See supra notes 105-15 and accompanying text (discussing the use of testimony
on child abuse at the sentencing hearing of Cheryl Pierson, which resulted in only a
six-month prison sentence following her plea of guilty to manslaughter); supra notes
97-100 and accompanying text (discussing a New York appellate court's reversal of the
trial court's denial of youthful offender status to Dawn Cruickshank).
177 See supra note 67 (noting Wyoming Governor Ed Hershler's decision to com-
mute Deborah Jahnke's prison sentence).
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